Higher-order theories of consciousness hold that a mental state becomes conscious when there's a higher-order representation of it—you're conscious of pain when you represent that you're in pain. This explains why states outside attention seem unconscious. But it seems possible to have higher-order representations of states you're not in—believing you're in pain when you're not. Would this false meta-representation create conscious pain? The theory seems to predict yes, but this seems wrong.
It can be inferred from the text that
higher-order theories have no explanatory virtues
conscious states can never be objects of higher-order representation
theories of consciousness may generate puzzling predictions that challenge their adequacy
false beliefs about our mental states are impossible
Correct Answer: C
Choice C is the best answer. The theory predicts something that "seems wrong."
- Context clues: The theory predicts false representation creates consciousness, but this seems wrong.
- Meaning: Unwelcome predictions challenge the theory.
- Verify: The word "seems to predict...but this seems wrong" shows a problematic prediction.
💡 Strategy: When a theory generates predictions that seem false, infer that predictions challenge the theory.
Choice A is incorrect because the theory "explains" why unattended states seem unconscious. Choice B is incorrect because the theory depends on higher-order representation of mental states. Choice D is incorrect because the objection assumes we can have false beliefs about our mental states.