Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism accepts that scientific theories make claims about unobservable entities (electrons, quarks) but says we should only believe theories are 'empirically adequate'—accurate about observables—not that unobservables exist. This 'acceptance without belief' has been called strange: can we coherently use theories to guide action while suspending belief in their central claims? Van Fraassen argues we can, distinguishing epistemic commitment from pragmatic engagement.
It can be inferred from the text that
constructive empiricism requires full belief in all theoretical claims
there's no distinction between belief and acceptance
proposed distinctions in philosophy may require defense against charges of incoherence
scientists never use theories to guide action
Correct Answer: C
Choice C is the best answer. The acceptance/belief distinction faces coherence challenges.
- Context clues: "Acceptance without belief" is called "strange"; Van Fraassen must defend the distinction.
- Meaning: Proposed distinctions need to be shown coherent.
- Verify: Separating epistemic commitment from pragmatic engagement is the defense.
💡 Strategy: When philosophical distinctions are called strange or incoherent, infer the need for defense.
Choice A is incorrect because the view involves acceptance without belief in unobservables. Choice B is incorrect because Van Fraassen's argument depends on distinguishing them. Choice D is incorrect because using theories pragmatically without full belief is exactly what's proposed.