Contextualism about knowledge claims holds that standards for 'knowing' vary by context—in everyday contexts low standards suffice, while in philosophy classes higher standards apply. This explains why skeptical arguments seem compelling in seminars but irrelevant in daily life. Critics argue that if 'knows' genuinely changes meaning across contexts, then opposing claims don't actually disagree—the philosopher and layperson are just talking past each other. Defenders argue this captures rather than distorts actual linguistic practice.
It can be inferred from the text that
skeptical arguments have no appeal in any context
knowledge standards are identical in all situations
philosophers and laypeople always mean exactly the same thing by 'know'
context-sensitivity in language may complicate our understanding of whether speakers genuinely disagree
Correct Answer: D
Choice D is the best answer. If meaning shifts, apparent disagreement may not be genuine.
- Context clues: Critics say meaning change means opposing claims "don't actually disagree."
- Meaning: Context-sensitivity raises questions about what counts as real disagreement.
- Verify: "Talking past each other" describes failed genuine disagreement.
💡 Strategy: When meaning variation can make disagreement apparent rather than real, infer complications about disagreement.
Choice A is incorrect because skeptical arguments "seem compelling in seminars." Choice B is incorrect because contextualism holds standards "vary by context." Choice C is incorrect because the whole point is that meaning may differ.