The lottery paradox, from Henry Kyburg, poses a problem for standard probability-based epistemology. In a fair lottery with a million tickets, you're justified in believing each individual ticket will lose (probability 0.999999). But you also know some ticket will win. If you believe each ticket loses, and beliefs can be conjoined, you believe all tickets lose—contradicting what you know. Either some justified beliefs can't be conjoined, or you can't justifiedly believe each ticket loses, or something else must give.
The passage suggests that
we should never form beliefs about probabilities
all lottery tickets are certain to lose
beliefs can always be safely conjoined without limit
principles that seem individually plausible may generate contradictions when combined
Correct Answer: D
Choice D is the best answer. Each principle seems reasonable but together they contradict.
- Context clues: Each claim seems justified individually, but together they contradict.
- Meaning: Individually plausible principles create problems in combination.
- Verify: "Something must give" shows the combination is unsustainable.
đź’ˇ Strategy: When individually reasonable claims generate contradiction, infer a conflict in combination.
Choice A is incorrect because probability-based beliefs motivate the paradox. Choice B is incorrect because some ticket will win—that's what generates the problem. Choice C is incorrect because the paradox questions whether beliefs can be conjoined.