Functionalism defines mental states by their causal roles—pain is whatever plays the 'pain role' (caused by tissue damage, causing avoidance behavior, distress). This allows multiple realizability: silicon and neurons could both support pain if they play the same role. But the 'absent qualia' objection asks whether a system functionally identical to you could lack conscious experience entirely—a 'zombie' that behaves like you but feels nothing. If conceivable, functionalism misses something about consciousness.
It can be inferred from the text that
functionalism denies that different physical systems could have mental states
whether functional organization is sufficient for consciousness remains philosophically contested
the absent qualia objection supports functionalism
physical realization is irrelevant to functional states
Correct Answer: B
Choice B is the best answer. The zombie objection questions whether function suffices for consciousness.
- Context clues: A functional duplicate might "lack conscious experience entirely."
- Meaning: If zombies are conceivable, function doesn't guarantee consciousness.
- Verify: "If conceivable, functionalism misses something about consciousness."
💡 Strategy: When a thought experiment challenges a theory's sufficiency, infer that sufficiency remains disputed.
Choice A is incorrect because functionalism explicitly allows "multiple realizability." Choice C is incorrect because the objection challenges functionalism, not supports it. Choice D is incorrect because multiple realizability shows different realizations can have the same function.