Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' challenged the descriptivist theory of names. Descriptivists held that names are shorthand for descriptions—'Aristotle' means 'the philosopher who tutored Alexander.' Kripke noted that we'd still refer to Aristotle even if we discovered he never tutored Alexander—the description could be false while the reference remains fixed. He proposed that names are 'rigid designators' that refer to the same individual in all possible worlds.
Based on the passage, it can be inferred that
the mechanism by which names refer may not depend on accurately describing their referents
Kripke believed names have no reference at all
descriptions associated with names can never be false
descriptivism perfectly explains how names function
Correct Answer: A
Choice A is the best answer. Reference persists even when descriptions are false.
- Context clues: We'd still refer to Aristotle if the description were false; reference "remains fixed."
- Meaning: Reference doesn't depend on accurate description.
- Verify: "Rigid designators" refer regardless of which descriptions apply.
💡 Strategy: When reference survives description failure, infer reference isn't description-based.
Choice B is incorrect because Kripke shows names do refer—as rigid designators. Choice C is incorrect because the example assumes the description "could be false." Choice D is incorrect because Kripke "challenged" descriptivism.