The 'hard problem of consciousness,' named by David Chalmers, asks why physical brain processes are accompanied by subjective experience—why there is 'something it is like' to see red or feel pain. Even a complete neuroscientific account of how the brain processes color would leave unexplained why the processing feels like anything at all. Some philosophers consider this problem genuinely unsolvable by current methods; others believe it will dissolve as neuroscience advances.
It can be inferred from the text that
neuroscience has fully explained subjective experience
explaining functional brain activity may not fully account for the phenomenal aspects of consciousness
all philosophers agree the hard problem is unsolvable
physical and experiential descriptions are already unified in current science
Correct Answer: B
Choice B is the best answer. Complete functional explanation still leaves experience unexplained.
- Context clues: A "complete neuroscientific account" would still leave unexplained "why the processing feels like anything."
- Meaning: There's a gap between functional and experiential descriptions.
- Verify: The problem is 'hard' precisely because functional explanation doesn't bridge to experience.
💡 Strategy: When a complete explanation of one type still leaves questions, infer a gap between explanation types.
Choice A is incorrect because the hard problem concerns what neuroscience can't yet explain. Choice C is incorrect because "some" consider it unsolvable; "others believe it will dissolve." Choice D is incorrect because the gap between physical and experiential is the problem.