Text 1: Philosopher Dr. Emma Moore defends objective moral knowledge. "Moral intuitions, properly refined, yield knowledge of moral truths," Moore argues. "Just as we trust perception after calibration, we can trust moral intuition after reflection."
Text 2: Empirical ethicist Dr. Robert Wong studies intuition origins. "Cross-cultural moral intuition divergence suggests cultural shaping rather than truth-tracking," Wong contends. "If intuitions tracked objective facts, we'd expect convergence. Variation challenges intuitions as knowledge source."
What does Wong suggest is empirically problematic about Moore's intuition-based epistemology?
That intuitions don't exist psychologically
That cross-cultural variation is difficult to explain if intuitions track objective moral facts
That perception always fails
That all moral views are identical
Correct Answer: B
Choice B is the correct answer. Moore uses perception analogy—intuitions track facts. Wong notes cultural divergence. If tracking objective facts, why variation? Divergence challenges the tracking claim.
- Evidence: Wong: "we'd expect convergence" if tracking truth.
- Reasoning: Variation suggests cultural origin, not objective detection.
- Conclusion: Divergence is problematic for truth-tracking.
Choice A is incorrect because Wong studies intuition. Choice C is incorrect because Wong's argument is about moral perception specifically. Choice D is incorrect because Wong emphasizes variation.