Text 1: Philosopher Dr. Helen Moore argues for functionalism about mind. "Mental states are defined by causal roles," Moore writes. "Pain is whatever state plays the pain-role—causing avoidance, complaint, distress. The implementing substrate doesn't matter."
Text 2: Philosopher Dr. David Park raises the spectrum inversion problem. "Two people could have functionally identical color experiences with inverted qualia," Park argues. "Your 'red' experience might feel like my 'green.' Function doesn't capture subjective quality."
What does Park's thought experiment suggest functionalism cannot adequately explain?
That mental states don't exist
The qualitative, subjective character of conscious experience
That behavior can be predicted
That causal roles can be described
Correct Answer: B
Choice B is the correct answer. Park's inversion scenario shows same function, different subjective quality. If qualia can vary with identical function, function doesn't capture what it's like—the qualitative character.
- Evidence: Park: "Function doesn't capture subjective quality."
- Reasoning: Functional identity + qualitative difference = qualities escape function.
- Conclusion: Phenomenal character eludes functional explanation.
Choice A is incorrect because Park assumes mental states exist. Choice C is incorrect because Park doesn't deny prediction. Choice D is incorrect because causal description is accepted.