The following text discusses epistemology.
Epistemic injustice, a concept developed by Miranda Fricker, describes wrongs done to people specifically in their capacity as knowers. "Testimonial injustice" occurs when prejudice leads hearers to give less credibility to speakers from marginalized groups—dismissing testimony because of who is speaking. "Hermeneutical injustice" occurs when gaps in collective interpretive resources leave some experiences without adequate concepts—as when sexual harassment lacked a term before feminist consciousness-raising. Both forms show how knowledge practices can be sites of oppression, not merely neutral truth-seeking.
What do both forms of epistemic injustice demonstrate?
Knowledge practices are always neutral and fair
Prejudice and resource gaps make knowledge practices sites of oppression
Only written testimony can be dismissed
All concepts exist for all experiences
Correct Answer: B
Choice B is the correct answer. The text concludes "both forms show how knowledge practices can be sites of oppression, not merely neutral truth-seeking"—prejudice (testimonial) and resource gaps (hermeneutical) enable this.
- Evidence: Prejudice reduces credibility; gaps leave experiences unnamed.
- Reasoning: Both mechanisms embed oppression in knowledge practices.
- Conclusion: Knowledge practices are not neutral but potentially oppressive.
Choice A is incorrect because the opposite is argued. Choice C is incorrect because oral testimony is also affected. Choice D is incorrect because hermeneutical injustice concerns conceptual gaps.