The following text is about philosophy of mind.
Epiphenomenalism holds that mental states are real but causally inert—they are caused by physical brain states but have no causal effects themselves. Like smoke rising from a fire, consciousness accompanies neural activity without influencing it. This view preserves the reality of mental experience while maintaining the causal closure of the physical. But critics argue it implies our felt experiences of deciding and acting are illusions; what we take to be mental causation is actually physical causation by brain states that merely happen to be accompanied by experience. This consequence strikes many as deeply counterintuitive.
What consequence of epiphenomenalism strikes critics as counterintuitive?
Mental states are caused by brain activity
Our experiences of deciding and acting are not actually causing our actions
Physical causation exists in the world
Consciousness exists
Correct Answer: B
Choice B is the correct answer. The counterintuitive consequence is that "our felt experiences of deciding and acting are illusions; what we take to be mental causation is actually physical causation."
- Evidence: Felt agency is illusion; mental causation is apparent, not real.
- Reasoning: If mental states don't cause actions, felt decision-making is misleading.
- Conclusion: Our experience of agency doesn't reflect reality.
Choice A is incorrect because this is accepted by critics too. Choice C is incorrect because no one disputes this. Choice D is incorrect because epiphenomenalism accepts consciousness exists; it just denies its effects.