The following text discusses philosophy of action.
The doctrine of mental causation—that mental states cause physical actions—seems obvious but faces philosophical challenges. If the physical world is causally closed (every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause), where do mental causes fit? Either mental states are identical to brain states (identity theory), or mental causation involves overdetermination (two sufficient causes for one effect), or mental states are epiphenomenal (real but causally inert). Each option has difficulties: identity seems to exclude conscious experience's qualitative character; overdetermination seems wasteful; epiphenomenalism makes our felt agency illusory.
What challenge to mental causation does the causal closure of physics create?
Mental states clearly have no relationship to brain states
If physical causes suffice for physical effects, the role of mental causes becomes unclear
Physical causes have been scientifically disproven
Actions never have any causes
Correct Answer: B
Choice B is the correct answer. The text asks "if the physical world is causally closed (every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause), where do mental causes fit?"
- Evidence: Physical causes sufficient; mental cause role unclear.
- Reasoning: No gap for mental causes if physical causes complete.
- Conclusion: Causal closure creates a placement problem for mental causation.
Choice A is incorrect because the options assume some relationship. Choice C is incorrect because physical closure is the premise. Choice D is incorrect because causation is assumed; the question is which causes.